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ABSTRACT
Terrorist organizations are both imitative and innovative in character. While the
drivers of imitation have been extensively modeled using concepts such as contagion
and diffusion, creativity and innovation remain relatively underdeveloped ideas in
the context of terrorist behavior. This article seeks to redress this deficiency by pre-
senting a conceptual framework with which we can understand the complex nature
and multiple drivers of creativity and innovation within terrorist organizations. The
overriding questions we address are: what factors spark creativity and innovation
within terrorist organizations, and are there particular organizational traits that
increase an organization’s propensity to be creative and innovative? Using insights
from industrial and organizational psychology and aided by illustrative examples
and case studies from the history of terrorism, we aim to show that the multiple
drivers of creativity and innovation are identifiable. By providing a conceptual
framework that explores these key issues, we suggest that a much clearer research
agenda for these issues may emerge. We conclude with a discussion concerning how
our framework can help inform counter-terrorism practices.
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Terrorist organizations are both imitative and innovative in character. Organiza-
tions espousing vastly different ideologies and goals frequently replicate a perceived
successful tactical or technological innovation established by another organization.
This process has been extensively modeled using concepts such as contagion (Bloom,
2005; Dugan, LaFree, & Piquero, 2005; Midlarsky, Crenshaw, & Yoshida, 1980;
Moghadam, 2008) and diffusion (Bonneuil & Auriat, 2000; Braithwaite & Li, 2007;
Horowitz, 2010). However, careful examination of creativity and innovation within
the context of terrorism still remain underdeveloped with notable exceptions from
Jackson et al. (2005), Dolnik (2007), and Rasmussen and Hafez (2010). This article
seeks to redress this deficiency by presenting a conceptual framework to aid in
understanding the complex nature and multiple drivers of creativity and innovation
within terrorist organizations.
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The overriding questions that guide our analysis are: what factors spark creativity
and innovation within terrorist organizations and are there particular organizational
traits that increase a terrorist organization’s propensity to be creative and innovative?
Using insights from social, cognitive, industrial/organizational, educational psycholo-
gies and the broader organizational behavior literature, applied to illustrative exam-
ples from the history of terrorism, we aim to show that although it is nearly
impossible to predict the precise onset of specific innovations within terrorist organi-
zations, given the correct information, it may be possible to predict a terrorist organi-
zation’s capacity for creativity. Our focus therefore is concerned with the process,
behaviors, and organizational capabilities that precede the onset of a terrorist innova-
tion. This focus potentially offers greater insights into counter-terrorism strategy
focused upon disrupting the abilities of terrorist organizations to operate in this way.
Put another way, we assert that it is possible to measure, in a terrorist organiza-
tion, many of the key variables crucial to the creative process. By providing a con-
ceptual framework that explores these key issues, a clearer research agenda for these
issues will emerge. While Rapoport estimates that 90% of terrorist organizations die
out or disappear within the first year of their existence (Cronin, 2009), perhaps a
key explanation for the survival of the remaining terrorist organizations is their abil-
ity to adapt, innovate and be creative against the more substantial state powers
against which they fight.
This article largely focuses on tactical innovation as opposed to strategic, or orga-
nizational innovation more broadly. Tactical innovation encompasses a terrorist
organization’s adoption of an entirely new method, mode or means of violence
rather than a terrorist organization’s capacity to copy or the forms of learning it
engages in. We first offer a succinct literature review of the organizational dynamics
of terrorism. Creativity is then distinguished from innovation—two concepts that
are often incorrectly used interchangeably within terrorism studies. Our approach is
consistent with the view of creativity as both process and product. Characterizing
creativity and innovation as processes requires us to understand the dynamic inter-
actions (and the properties that govern those interactions) by multiple actors. The
ability to first generate ideas for a new tactic (including who to target and how to
deliver the attack) or how to adapt certain technologies and then use them in com-
bat entails understanding how the creative process works. It also entails understand-
ing how organizational structures and management systems facilitate this process. In
turn, this involves understanding the drivers of creativity from both a bottom-up
(creativity in individuals and small groups) and a top-down (leadership and intra-
organizational structural effects) perspective while also accounting for the competi-
tive environment in which terrorist organizations operate against a much stronger
foe. The multi-dimensional, multi-causal, and dynamic nature of the creativity pro-
cess is outlined. Characterizing the result of this process as product requires outlin-
ing the factors that underpin an assessment of a product’s creativity and likelihood
of diffusion. Finally, this article concludes by applying the theoretical model to two
case studies of terrorist plots and summarizes the model’s implications for counter-
terrorism policy.
126
Malevolent Creativity in Terrorist Organizations
ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
Studies that focus upon the organizational dynamics of terrorism generally fall
into one of three categories, with each category being characterized by a distinct
overriding research question;
1 Why do organizations use terrorism?
2 How do organizations learn and copy terrorist tactics?
3 How do organizations create and innovate with new terrorist tactics?
Arguably, the third question has as much, if not more, operational significance
for counter-terrorism practitioners. How terrorist organizations innovate with new
tactics represents a different concern from adopting a tactic from another terrorist
organization’s repertoire. A problem with the emphasis on learning from other ter-
rorist organizations is that much of what we learn can only be observed after an
attack. The implication being that there is little scope for understanding how and
when to intervene in the development of a terrorist attack. By applying theory and
frameworks from other literatures, our intent is to develop a predictive model of
terrorist innovation from which we can gain predictive capacities to aid in the inves-
tigation and disruption of terrorist plots.
WHY DO ORGANIZATIONS USE TERRORISM?
Rational-choice types of explanations seek to explain why organizations engage in
violence. The wealth of studies on suicide bombing provides a useful illustration.
Various analyses emphasized suicide bombing’s strategic utility (Gupta & Mundra,
2005; Pape, 2005), its ability to balance power in an asymmetric war (Luft, 2002),
its power to produce system collapse (Hafez, 2007), and its role as a signaling act
(Hoffman & McCormack, 2004). Bloom (2005) emphasizes the relationship between
suicide bombing, domestic political competition, and the search for public support.
Ganor (2000) highlights other strategic motives such as the efficiency with which the
bomber can still activate the charge when captured. Although these studies offer a
great deal of insight into why terrorist organizations may choose to engage in this
particular manifestation of terrorist violence, their intent is descriptive rather than
proscriptive, and they often overlook micro-level decisions that are capable of being
manipulated or disrupted by counter-terrorist agencies. Such micro-level decisions
include questions such as the following: What structures facilitate certain manifesta-
tions of violence? What drives the decision to choose one tactic over another? What
drives a terrorist organization to copy the tactics of others? What facilitates a terror-
ist organization to innovate in terms of technology or delivery methods used?
HOW DO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS LEARN AND COPY TACTICS?
A growing number of studies on the organizational dimension of terrorism have
begun to focus upon in-group antecedent behaviors and organizational traits that
lead to terrorist violence. These studies focus upon how organizations engage in
violence. At the forefront of these studies, researchers focus upon what types of
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violence are likely to be replicated as well as organizational traits that make replica-
tion of another organization’s tactics more likely. The majority of these studies
follow in the manner of Midlarsky et al. (1980) who quantitatively illustrate the
contagion effect that occurred transnationally during the rise of terrorist violence
between 1968 and 1974. They also examined the types of violence most likely to be
replicated elsewhere. Bombings, kidnappings, and hijackings diffused much more
readily across borders than assassinations and raids according to the analysis.
More recently, suicide bombing experts such as Pape (2005), Bloom (2005), and
Moghadam (2008) utilized process-tracing techniques to emphasize the key role suc-
cess plays in facilitating a tactic’s diffusion or contagion. Dugan et al. (2005) present
a time-series analysis of 1,101 attempted aerial hijackings to illustrate that hijacking
rates significantly increase due to copy-cat processes. In a highly sophisticated
account, Horowitz (2010) demonstrates that external linkages and organizational
capabilities facilitate a terrorist organization’s ability to copy the innovation of oth-
ers. For Horowitz, a terrorist organization willing to engage in suicide bombings yet
missing the organizational capability or the necessary ties with others is unlikely to
be able to sustain a campaign of suicide bombings.
While many studies on terrorism acknowledge that successful terrorist organiza-
tions must learn, very few show how they learn. According to Kenney (2007), it is
unfortunate that “many government officials, policy analysts, and even researchers
gloss over how…terrorists…actually learn, in the sense of acquiring, analyzing, and
applying knowledge and experience…It is not enough simply to claim, as many do,
that…terrorists learn” (p. 13). Kenney focuses upon training practices and outlines
the various means by which al Qaeda has spread knowledge through its network.
Examples include state sponsorship, training camps, knowledge-based artifacts such
as training manuals, “informal apprenticeships, on-the-job training, communities of
practice, and combat” (Kenney, 2007, p. 145). Kenney (2010a,b) has also undertaken
excellent analyses of knowledge and tradecraft amongst Islamist militants in Britain,
Spain and online.
HOW DO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS CREATE AND INNOVATE WITH
NEW TACTICS?
Other studies have emphasized a change in focus toward terrorist innovation.
This recent trend is a critical move away from previous analyses that emphasized a
lack of creativity and innovation within terrorist organizations. For example, Merari
(1999) compared terrorism to conventional war and argued that terrorism “has not
changed much in the course of a century, and virtually not at all during the last
25 years” (p. 54). Hoffman (1993) also noted the remarkable consistency and con-
servative nature of terrorist attacks. Dolnik (2007) concurs asserting, “What we have
witnessed is that this scope [of terrorist attacks] is relatively limited and remarkably
unchanging. In fact when one surveys the last 50 years of terrorist operations case
by case, very few incidents strike the observer as creative in any way” (p. 56).
However, as the data-driven study of terrorism and political violence slowly
becomes more fine grained and comparative in nature, the focus has shifted to how
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(not just why) terrorism occurs. There is a creeping acknowledgment that innova-
tion regularly occurs and can be categorized in a number of ways. Crenshaw (2010)
offered a typology of terrorist innovation, delineating three kinds. First, adopting
new technologies to achieve unchanged objectives constitutes tactical innovation. A
well-known example is Hezbollah’s adoption of suicide bombings in the early 1980s.
The same is true when they largely abandoned suicide bombings to rely on more
conventional bombings during the 1990s. Tactical innovation is not limited to attack
types, but can also be extended to delivery systems, the adoption of new technolo-
gies, initiation types, IED types, and changing the profile of operatives. Second,
adopting new objectives comprises strategic innovation. For example, the increasing
politicization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army through the 1980s and
1990s, reflected in the growing power and status of its political wing Sinn Fein, lar-
gely reflects a strategic innovation at the elite level of the movement. Third, changes
at the organizational level in terms of structure or recruiting processes represent
organizational innovation. Again, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (hereafter
PIRA) provides an excellent example. A large-scale re-organization of PIRA’s struc-
ture to a tighter cellular-based network in which cells acted independently of one
another occurred between 1977 and 1980 (Coogan, 2000). Previously, PIRA struc-
tured itself like a conventional army with various brigades, battalions, and compa-
nies responsible for specific geographical combat areas. This change placed far less
emphasis on the quantity of recruits and far more emphasis on secrecy and disci-
pline than the preceding phase. Almost instantly, the effects of the structural changes
became noticeable with 465 fewer charges for paramilitary offences occurring within
a year (Smith, 1997, p. 145).
The shift of emphasis within terrorism studies toward understanding issues sur-
rounding innovation is perhaps best illustrated by a 2010 conference at the U.S. Naval
Postgraduate School that brought together a number of terrorism experts to present
on various case studies of terrorist attacks across a wide spectrum of actors and con-
flicts. Collectively, the analysts agreed on a number of issues. They agreed that more
resources (financial and human) potentially lead to more prolific innovation. The par-
ticipants also agreed that leadership plays a central role, but there was no agreement
on what type of leadership facilitates innovation most. Finally, they agreed that inno-
vation itself is often incremental and driven by the need to overcome security con-
straints. As such, the analysts argued that the ability to develop predictive indicators is
next to impossible. One respondent, Gary Ackerman (2010), asserted that precondi-
tions of innovation include feasibility and compatibility, hospitable environment, net-
works of actors, ample resource reserves and risk tolerance. Concurrently, drivers of
innovation include problem solving, competition and status, invention and discovery.
These studies appear fixated with predicting the onset of specific innovations and
regularly acknowledge exasperation in efforts made to reach this goal. The lack of
inter-disciplinary work and intended operational relevance for counter-terrorism
practitioners may explain these shortcomings. Our focus, however, informed by
industrial and organizational psychology and other related disciplines, is more con-
cerned with the process, behaviors, and organizational capabilities that precede the
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onset of an innovation. Not only is an organization’s capacity for creativity and
innovation observable but also offers far more insights into a counter-terrorism
policy focused upon interrupting the abilities of terrorist organizations to operate.
CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION AS A PROCESS
Issues concerning innovation and creativity typically possess a romanticized per-
sona. Researchers and organizations alike overly celebrate its benefits while neglect-
ing creativity’s negative consequences (McLaren, 1993). Creativity is assumed to be
largely “benevolent”—directed toward what most would consider ethical, appropri-
ate, and desirable goals (Cropley, Kaufman, & Cropley, 2008). More recently,
researchers have begun to focus on the “dark side of creativity” (Cropley, Cropley,
Kaufman, & Runco, 2010). The concept of malevolent creativity and its applicability
to issues surrounding terrorism and crime have recently emerged. Malevolent crea-
tivity is depicted as a creative effort deemed necessary and right by some organiza-
tion or individual working to fulfill self-interested goals, but also entails intended
negative consequences for some other group. Malevolent creativity is conducted with
the conscious intention to benefit the self or organization and an awareness of its
negative consequences on others. It should not be confused with creative efforts that
somehow unintentionally lead to harmful outcomes, such as the invention of the
automobile which had other unintentional negative consequences for the environ-
ment. Of course, the extent to which creativity is truly benevolent or malevolent is
subjective—it might be viewed by one person as necessary and beneficial, but
directly hurts another individual or organization. Given the creative endeavor
involved in secretly plotting terrorist attacks with limited resources and personnel
against a stronger foe, acts of terrorism saliently exemplify contemporary malevolent
creativity.
One of the key early theoretical findings within the emergent literature was the
observation that creativity and innovation, although linked, represent two distinct
entities that combine as a process in the formation of a product. While creativity
refers to the generation of ideas and novel concepts, innovation involves implement-
ing these ideas (Amabile, 1996). In other words, for an innovation to occur, it must
first go through a creative process from idea generation through to full implementa-
tion (outlined below). The transition from a creative idea to an innovative product
(in this case a terrorist attack) is the key process to understand. This theoretical
insight has, to date, not diffused to the few existing studies of creativity and innova-
tion in terrorist organizations, which typically use the terms creativity and innova-
tion interchangeably and depict both as a static phenomenon (one major exception
being the case of Cropley, Kaufman and Cropley, 2008). This is surprising consider-
ing its practical importance for counter-terrorism efforts. While terrorist organiza-
tions may devise an extremely creative act of violence, if they lack the organizational
ability to carry it out, the creative act will never become an innovative one. Also, a
terrorist organization with the resources for innovation but lacking the traits needed
for creativity will become too repetitive and ultimately stagnate in terms of tactics
employed. By depicting creativity and innovation as a process, phase-specific
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intervention points may also be identifiable for counter-terrorism practitioners
(Cropley, Kaufman and Cropley, 2008). This further demonstrates the practical
importance of understanding the nature of the creative process within terrorist orga-
nizations. This article will demonstrate that although the ability to predict and antic-
ipate the onset of creativity within a terrorist organization is almost impossible, the
ability to predict capacity for innovation is relatively more realizable, given the right
information or intelligence.
Contrary to common perception, innovation and creativity are not akin to a
spontaneous flash of a light-bulb moment. Instead, they result from a well-aimed,
intentional search for improvement (Anderson & Gasteiger, 2007). Often the process
is meticulous and follows a general pattern of problem definition, idea generation
and exploration, and idea implementation (Amabile, 1996; Finke, Ward, & Smith,
1992; Wallas, 1926). The classic model of creative process described creativity as a
sequence of preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification stages of cogni-
tive processing (Wallas, 1926). The preparation stage is characterized by a prelimin-
ary analysis of the problem drawing from existing knowledge and skills. The
incubation stage occurs when the individual shifts his or her main focus to another
task, but at the same time, analytical thinking regarding the problem and its related
associations are still occurring at the backstage. When promising ideas appear to
emerge suddenly, the illumination stage is said to have taken place. Once creative
and innovative ideas are formed, the individual engages in a verification stage where
conscious effort is taken to evaluate and refine the ideas for improvement.
Although the classic model of creative process received much empirical support, it
is not without criticism. The classic model has been described as too abstract and as
offering limited testable hypotheses. Subsequent models of creative problem solving
instead focused on characterizing creativity as a dynamic, recursive process where indi-
viduals move back and forth from the sub-stages of cognitive thinking prior to the final
formulation of the creative product (Mumford, Mobley, Uhlman, Reiter-Pamon, &
Doares, 1991). Some even go so far as to discourage the examination of the creative
process altogether and call for a focus on the information-processing steps occurring
within each stage of the creative process (Lubart, 2001). Nevertheless, most process
models of creativity follow a general pattern of problem definition, idea generation
and exploration, and idea implementation (Amabile, 1996; Finke et al., 1992; Merri-
field, Guilford, Christensen, & Frick, 1962; Osborn, 1953; Wallas, 1926).
Researchers have expanded and refined these classic models of creativity. Mum-
ford et al.’s (1991) eight-stage model of creativity has become a widely known and
used model. The stages include problem construction, information gathering, cate-
gory search, selection of best-fitting categories, combining and reorganizing category
information, idea evaluation, idea implementation, and monitoring. In other words,
the creative process begins with defining or recognizing the existence of a problem,
acquiring and retrieving relevant information to help with the problem, reorganizing
and combining selected information in new ways to facilitate the creative process,
implementing the solution, and finally, conducting regular monitoring and
evaluation of the problem solution to ensure that the solution met initial goals. In
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some cases, organizations engage in an additional stage of solution optimization to
refine the product prior to its launch (Basadur & Gelade, 2006).
Finally, the creative process is distinct from noncreative processes in several ways.
First, the creative process involves targeting an ill-defined problem whereby individ-
uals typically engage in the creative process to identify novel and alternative solu-
tions to the problem. In contrast, noncreative processes may consider using
previously acquired solutions to solve the problem. The creative process is character-
ized by recursive and dynamic thought patterns of divergent and convergent think-
ing while the noncreative process typically occurs in a linear and additive fashion.
When existing information is used in the creative process, it is usually combined
with new information and reorganized to facilitate problem solution. On the other
hand, in noncreative processes, information is recalled and reused in its original
form without much recategorization (Mumford et al., 1991).
CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION AS PRODUCT
In terms of products, psychologists assert that the core characteristics of creativity
are concerned with novelty/originality, relevance, elegance, and generalizability. Crea-
tive products are novel and generate effective surprise in their beholder while remain-
ing relevant and useful (Cropley et al., 2008). Essentially, the product must meet both
consumer and target population needs. A creative product lacking relevance and effec-
tiveness is merely aesthetic. Terrorist attacks can be measured along these lines. For a
terrorist attack, the consumer is usually the community that the terrorist organization
claims to represent (i.e., PIRA claimed to represent Irish Catholics). However, the ter-
rorist organization’s target audience is often an audience beyond the direct victims of
the violence. Spontaneous novel acts of violence generate effective surprise within the
target audience. The violence and its subsequent media coverage generate an image of
the terrorist organization as strong, cohesive, and relevant.
Hezbollah’s use of suicide truck and car bombers between November 1982 and
October 1983 offers a useful illustration of a novel product that possessed relevance
and effectiveness while causing the effective response amongst the target population
and satiating consumer needs. In terms of novelty, this campaign is often credited as
the first sustained use of suicide bombings. In essence, Hezbollah’s suicide bombings
generated effective surprise amongst the target population and Hezbollah achieved
these goals while mobilizing support amongst their consumers. The first bombing
targeted an Israeli Defence Force military HQ and killed over 60 personnel. The next
suicide bombing killed further 60 and injured over 100 when the U.S. Embassy in
Beirut was attacked. Furthermore, in October 1983, over 300 French and U.S. sol-
diers were killed in coordinated suicide bombing attacks on their respective barracks.
The level of fatalities caused illustrates the effective surprise deployed against Israeli,
French, and U.S. troops. Subsequently, U.S. and French troops evacuated Lebanon.
The novelty, scale, and intensity of these suicide bombing attacks lead to its unprec-
edented success. Within 2 years of their opening suicide bombings, Hezbollah
emerged from dozens of aspirant militant organizations active at the time in Leba-
non to be the most preeminent amongst them. The novelty of suicide bombings and
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the symbolic power and martyrdom narratives inherent in them played a key role
here in ensuring their relevance to their consumer audience (e.g., the community
they claim to represent).
Counter-terrorist forces aim to reduce novelty in terrorist attacks because novelty
is a particularly dangerous element. Furthermore, media coverage of terrorist attacks
can often reduce the novelty of subsequent attacks. For example, early PIRA letter-
bombs in England were highly novel and caused much disruption. The longer this
manifestation of violence continued, media warnings increased vigilance within the
wider public and subsequently eroded novelty value (O’Doherty, 2008). In another
example, passengers of United flight 93 were able to prevent terrorists from crashing
the plane into their intended target because they had learned of the earlier terrorist
attacks that morning and responded in anticipation of those specific events re-occur-
ring (Cropley et al., 2008).
The timing of a bombing attack also affects the value of the novelty. PIRA bom-
ber Shane Paul O’Doherty explains in his autobiography: “It was a bad idea to deto-
nate a bomb on a Saturday evening. It was too late to be reported in most Sunday
newspapers” (O’Doherty, 2008, p. 118). Once a set of skills is perfected, terrorists
may tend to rely on this expertise. However, the problem with creative, but
repeated, acts of terrorism is the element of diminishing returns. Truly creative acts
of terrorism often contain novelty value. Over time, however, the novelty dimin-
ishes. To sidestep diminishing novelty, terrorist organizations regularly shift tactics
in terms of who is targeted, the attack method, the components of the bomb, or the
delivery method. This involves a return to the creative process depicted above.
Another element of creativity is the elegance of the solution. Elegance refers to
whether the product is logical, sensible, and well-crafted. In other words, “good
solutions look like good solutions” (Cropley et al., 2008, p. 108). For example, Dol-
nik and Bhattacharjee (2002) discuss the costs and benefits to Hamas in using sui-
cide bombings, rockets, and chemical weapons. They conclude that suicide
bombings provide “greater overall net benefits than any other option. The techno-
logical simplicity, cost-effectiveness, controllability of consequences, ease of avoiding
defensive countermeasures, and the morale boosting nature of suicide bombings
make it the ultimately favorable tactic for fulfilling Hamas’ objectives” (Dolnik &
Bhattacharjee, 2002, p. 121). So while chemical warfare may enhance organizational
prestige and increase deterrence costs, the fact that suicide bombings are cheaper,
less likely to alienate their constituency and more cost-effective means that this par-
ticular manifestation of violence is far more elegant than a chemical attack in the
short-term at least.
Broadly speaking, organizational behavior researchers assert that creative solutions
must also be generalizable. This refers to the degree of applicability of the product,
not only in terms of satisfying target population needs, but also the extent to which it
sparks new ideas and inventions, challenges the status quo, and generates new ways to
resolve current problems (Cropley et al., 2008). For example, the benefits from the
original invention of the wheel are obvious, but its long-lasting impact comes from its
generalizability. The wheel sparked challenges amongst the status quo by creating the
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need for smooth roads, sparked new ideas and inventions such as modern propellers,
jet engines, and turbines, and generated new ways of resolving current problems such
as the transportation of heavy materials over long distances. For terrorist organiza-
tions, suicide bombings are a highly generalizable tactic. Since the Hezbollah bomb-
ings outlined above, Shia organizations’ suicide bombings were appropriated by
Sunni Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, and secular terrorist organizations such as the
Tamil Tigers who are mainly comprised of Hindus. It is a tactic used by vastly differ-
ent terrorist organizations espousing vastly different religious, political, or ideological
objectives. Also, minor changes to suicide bombings have occurred over the years
such that its novelty and generalizability have been sustained. The Lebanese progeni-
tors of suicide bombing primarily used car and truck bombings. The use of individu-
als within the vehicles to detonate the bombings was a new innovation to the more
conventional car bombing campaigns developed by the anarchist group the Gallea-
nists in the U.S. at the turn of the 20th century and later perfected by the likes of the
PIRA. Many of the early Tamil Tigers suicide bombings resembled those of the Leba-
nese organizations. Use of car and truck bombings proliferated. They also improved
upon earlier failed Lebanese attempts at using boats to attack naval vessels. The Tamil
Tigers were the first militant organization to employ the suicide belt that individuals
tie around their waist. Following the belt bomb innovation by the Tamil Tigers, the
Palestinian organizations used them around 70% of the time. Males exclusively
carried out 9 years of suicide bombings until January 2002 when Fatah’s al-Aqsa
Martyr’s Brigade employed Wafa Idris. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad soon fol-
lowed suit in employing women as suicide bombers. The more recent use of proxy
bombers (in Northern Ireland, Iraq, Columbia) who are intentionally killed is also a
form of adaptation of a suicide bombing (e.g., using a human body to conceal, deliver
and ultimately detonate the explosive device).
Finally, there are two forms of product innovation—incremental and radical
innovation. These variants differ in the degree to which they are revolutionary and
novel. Radical innovation consists of fundamental changes that strike a clear depar-
ture from existing processes and products. Incremental innovation describes small
adjustments to the current technology or product (Dewar & Dutton, 1986). Radical
innovation represents the core of creating effective surprise and shock in consumers.
Radically creative products possess the surprise factor of being rarely anticipated and
thus provide a competitive advantage to the designers by making it extremely diffi-
cult for competitors to emulate the product’s unique qualities. In this case, instead
of the products being, for example, consumer goods, creative outcomes are success-
ful subway gas attacks, effective improvised explosive devices, strategic recruitment
of new extremists, and responsive counter-attacks against military officials. Of
course, this advantage lasts only until the competitors in turn generate a more tech-
nologically advanced and desirable product. In the same way as businesses compete
with one another, the war on terror is seen as a dynamic struggle between law
enforcement officials and terrorists to out-perform one another by employing
increasingly creative means to effectively strike at their targets and evade detection
(Cropley, Kaufman and Cropley (2008), p. 107).
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Incremental innovations in general do not provide the same instant impact that
radical innovations possess.
It is self-evident that a business entering a market with a product that has
never been seen will, at least initially, have no competition. A less creative
product, for example, one that is simply an incremental improvement on an
existing product, will not exhibit the same degree of revolutionary impact.
Competitors will be quick to respond with their own incremental
improvements. In simple terms, creative products (or, more generally, creative
solutions) are harder to anticipate than routine (noncreative) solutions. For
this reason, it is hard to compete against a truly creative revolutionary
product. (Cropley et al., 2008, p. 107)
Incremental innovations in terrorist attacks, however, do not necessarily follow
this same pattern. In the words of one senior British Explosives Ordnance Disposal
officer; “No terrorist bomb is necessarily new. It’s usually born of a bomb used in
previous campaigns” (Styles, 1975, p. 160). For example, building on previous tech-
nology and knowledge, terrorist organizations creatively modify and adapt their
bombs and explosive devices to confuse and undermine counter-insurgency mea-
sures taken by security and law enforcement officials. PIRA kept in their arsenal
variations of a bomb type that they released one by one so that authorities had more
difficulty keeping track and designing effective counter-strategies against them. For
example, one version of the bomb would utilize a metal casing, which dictates the
use of a metal detector by security officers to find them, but the proceeding one
would be encased in plastic, rendering metal detectors useless in bomb investigation
scenes. In other words, most IEDs are “the product of terrorist ingenuity and
although, outwardly, a device may resemble a well-tried or proven model, internal
changes such as anti-handling devices, collapsing circuits and other modifications
may be encountered” (Ryder, 2005, p. xii). All of these additions represent malevo-
lent incremental innovations that bomb disposal units struggle to keep on top of.
Effective terrorist innovations can therefore be both radical and incremental. The
drivers of both variants are elaborated upon in the next section.
THE MULTI-LEVEL DRIVERS OF CREATIVITY IN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS
The beginning of a creative process is not random. Instead, multiple levels of inter-
acting actors combine to initiate the creative process. Interplay of individuals, teams,
leaders, organizations, and environments contributes to this process. Figure 1 depicts
this process below. Innovation therefore is multiply determined and each level of anal-
ysis is expanded upon below with illustrative examples from the history of terrorism.
TERRORISM, CREATIVITY, AND THE GREATER ENVIRONMENT
Environmental drivers of terrorist innovation can be both distal (often clumsily
encompassed under presumed “root causes” of terrorism) and proximal (counter-
terrorism policies). Mumford and Hunter (2005) suggest that dissatisfaction with
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the current state of affairs within one’s community or state can be a strong motiva-
tor for innovation. Terrorism’s social, political, and systemic preconditions may
therefore offer a fertile ground for creativity. By themselves, however, the underlying
causes and preconditions of terrorism cannot explain creativity in terrorist organiza-
tions. All terrorist organizations stem from a sense of religious, political, social,
national, or cultural grievance; yet, terrorist organizations also display a distinct
heterogeneity in how creative they are at first glance. For example, PIRA is widely
recognized as overseeing the greatest innovation and deepest expertise in the con-
struction and deployment of IEDs by any non-state violent organization. PIRA-
based IED technology and technical acumen later emerged in conflict zones across
Colombia, Israel, Lebanon, Spain, Iraq, and Afghanistan. On the other hand, loyalist
terrorist organizations in Northern Ireland often displayed a complete incapacity to
innovate in IED-related technology (Styles, 1975).
Thus, a desire for change is not enough to encourage creativity in all terrorist
organizations. To understand this disparity in creative output, we must look further
into more proximal causes that individuals and terrorist organizations experience in
their daily behavioral routines rather than abstract notions of distal grievances. One
such proximal environmental driver is that of external agencies imposing the need
for innovation on a terrorist organization. As Crenshaw (2010) notes, the social
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FIGURE 1. A conceptual framework for understanding innovation and creativity in
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movement literature embodied by Tarrow (1994) suggests something similar in “that
government actions as well as new opportunities and constituencies stimulate
innovation in social movements and their strategies of protest” (p. 43).
For terrorist organizations, three types of external agencies exist. First, effective
counter-terrorism policies may force terrorist organizations to experiment with other
creative acts of violence. At the same time, new counter-terrorism policies, while
increasing the pressure to innovate, may also curtail a terrorist organization’s capac-
ity for creativity and innovation. Mass arrests of highly skilled and intelligent bomb-
makers may leave a gap in the terrorist organization’s structure that will take time
to replenish through requisite training and experience. The decapitation of a terror-
ist organization’s elite may also lead to a shift in emphasis within the terrorist orga-
nization away from innovation and toward more tried and tested violent repertoires.
Terrorist organizations espousing similar goals may attempt to outbid one
another for community support and this represents a second form of external
agency that may drive creativity and innovation for a terrorist organization. Com-
munity support for particular types of violence may also encourage terrorist organi-
zations to innovate and fulfill these needs and this encapsulates the third form of
external agency. Bloom’s (2005) outbidding hypothesis caters to these two external
agencies. Bloom hypothesizes that these dynamics account for why Fatah’s al-Aqsa
Martyr’s Brigade ultimately adopted suicide bombings as a tactical innovation.
Fatah’s diminishing community support at the expense of organizations such as
Hamas coupled with high community support for suicide bombings provides incen-
tive for Fatah to create new tactics.
Furthermore, innovation is a process of change, which is inherently a temporal
phenomenon (Lubart, 2001). Thus, planning is crucial for successfully releasing new
products. Planning requires understanding market trends and development opportu-
nities. However, without appropriate testing and evaluation, the product can fail.
Thus, external pressure may place a greater emphasis on idea evaluation with inno-
vative products (Mueller, Melwani, & Goncalo, 2011). These findings from the orga-
nizational psychology literature resemble much theorizing from the field of social
movement studies. Grievances in and of themselves fail to account for the emer-
gence of violent contentious actions. Instead, organizational elites utilize political
opportunity structures to maximize their chances of mobilizing previously passive
but potential recruits and supporters. The same is true for particular manifestations
of violence once mobilization has begun (see Sarma, 2007).
TERRORISM AND ORGANIZATIONAL-LEVEL CREATIVITY
Organizational-level variables that drive creativity can be placed into two catego-
ries: variables that organizational leaders can manipulate and variables that are out-
side the control of terrorist organizational leaders. The latter encompasses variables
such as organizational age and success. Aging organizations contain larger contin-
gents of aging workers who may hold expectations that the status quo will remain
(Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). Likewise, successful organizations are the most likely
to become entrenched in their practices because of previous rewards. Often, the
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external agencies elaborated upon above may force change before a successful or
relatively old organization is prepared to embrace it.
Organizational-level variables of creativity that leaders can control are numerous
but include organizational structure, organizational size, offering extrinsic/intrinsic
rewards, ensuring a collaborative environment, building inter-team trust, engaging
in participatory decision-making, encouraging a unified commitment to the project,
appointing principled leadership, financial resources, obtaining external support and
recognition, adopting a flexible approach to roles and behaviors that accommodate
emergent ideas, provision of feedback and encouragement to “be creative” (Abetti,
2000; Carson & Carson, 1993; Grant & Berry, 2011; James, Clark, & Cropanzano,
1999; Shalley, 1991). Given the secretive nature of terrorist organizations, most of
these variables cannot be applied to individual case studies short of interviews with
disengaged militants. Arguably, only four of these specific variables can be measured
from open sources; organizational structure, organizational size, financial resources
and external support networks—the effects of each are elaborated upon below with
reference to terrorism examples.
The creativity literature illustrates that a flexible, organic structure, as opposed to
a bureaucratic structure, is more conducive to innovation in organizations (Drazin
& Schoonhoven, 1996; Hunter, Friedrich, Bedell-Avers, & Mumford, 2007). For
example, in Hellstrom and Hellstrom’s (2002) qualitative study, most respondents
perceive organizational rules as hindering creativity. While workers depend upon
quick feedback because “ideas are perishable goods”, informal networks possess the
danger of ideas being stolen for the benefits of others. Thus, while too much struc-
ture suffocates creativity, too little structure deters idea generation, subsequent eval-
uation, and the processes needed for full implementation. Al-Qaeda’s pursuit of
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (hereafter CBRN) materials acts as a
perfect example of how a terrorist organization’s structure affects the creative pro-
cess. The total decentralization of al-Qaeda activities (depicted by Sageman, 2005) in
the wake of 9/11 and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan caused a major change
in the scale, intensity, expertise, and maturity in al-Qaeda’s search for CBRN. The
pre-9/11 somewhat flexibly structured al-Qaeda typically sought either to obtain or
develop sophisticated nuclear, radiological, and biological devices from South Africa
in 1993, Russia and Chechnya in 1996, Sudan in 1998, Pakistan in 1999, and
Afghanistan between 1999 and 2001 as well as attempts to deal with A.Q. Khan’s
nuclear network in Pakistan that supplied states like North Korea with nuclear tech-
nology. On the other hand, the post-9/11 decentralized network’s efforts to date are
marked by a discernable shift toward smaller, cruder biological and chemical devices.
Typically, attacks using such devices were devised, planned, and plotted by cells and
affiliates loosely connected (if at all) to al-Qaeda central and its leaders such as Za-
wahiri, Bin Laden, and al-Suri. They focus less on nuclear and radiological compo-
nents and shift emphasis toward chemical components. They also tend to be cruder
than the more elaborate plans devised in the Afghan training camps. The geographic
spread of these plots is extensive, far greater than the targeted focus of pre-9/11
plots.
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Furthermore, Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) illustrate that larger organizations pos-
sessing complicated interlinked structures may be dependent on a network of external
ties and suppliers that provide raw materials for their products and can hesitate to
innovate in order to leave the ties undisturbed. The cost and difficulty of implanting
change incentivizes some organizations to remain rooted in terms of structures, sys-
tems, procedures, and processes. This fact may be even more compounded for terror-
ist organizations for whom downsizing the cadre against their will may lead to the
formation of splinter groups, informants, and disillusionment amongst the remaining
militants. Cognizant of these dangers, PIRA’s shift from a traditional hierarchical
structure to a cellular based one in the late 1970s also occurred according to internal
PIRA documents because of a need to “return to secrecy and discipline” occurred
alongside the development of an auxiliary unit who were charged with a “policing
role” within Catholic communities (Coogan, 2000, p. 467). Rather than this structural
change leading to a mass decommissioning of trained operatives, auxiliary units
mainly became composed of individuals deemed unsuitable for PIRA activity against
British rule in Northern Ireland. In effect, this unlikely structural change was managed
through role migration within the violent movement.
Although a large organization’s resources can be conducive to innovation, it may
also lead to losing focus, which in turn leads to poor planning (Halbesleben, Novic-
evic, Harvey, & Buckley, 2003). This largely explains why PIRA decided to change
their structure 7 years after its formation. Their now publicly available staff report,
which documented these changes, addresses this problem up front:
We are burdened with an inefficient infrastructure of commands, brigades,
battalions, and companies. This old system with which the [British Army] and
[Special] Branch are familiar has to be changed. We recommend
reorganization and remotivation, the building of a new Irish Republican Army.
(Coogan, 2000, p. 465)
External support for terrorist organizations may come in many forms. First, the
terrorist organization’s constituency of people it claims to represent may offer active
or passive support. PIRA, for example, received active support from American-based
supporters both in monetary terms (which allowed for the purchase of necessary
equipment/materials) and in technical expertise (largely in the form of Richard
Clark Johnson, a NASA-trained electrical engineer who helped PIRA develop radio
and radar-controlled initiation systems; Oppenheimer, 2009). Passive support for
PIRA activity in the independent Republic of Ireland aided much of the arms train-
ing and engineering experiments conducted by PIRA with little fear of informants
from the wider community. Second, financial and operational support from state
governments constitutes external support. The training, bases, arms, intelligence, and
finances from governments and security agencies such as the Ministry of State
Security (the Stasi) in the former German Democratic Republic, Syria, and Libya
undoubtedly aided the transformation of Carlos the Jackal’s international terrorist
network into an innovative, elusive, and adaptive terrorist organization. Third, as
demonstrated by Horowitz (2010), the more organizational ties and ideological simi-
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larities, the more likely it is that one terrorist organization will innovate by replicat-
ing the tactics of the other terrorist organization in the dyad.
Despite innovation and creativity’s obvious benefits, they are often met with vary-
ing degrees of resistance (Mueller et al., 2011). Individuals proposing new ideas
challenging the current social and technical systems may face opposition (Anderson
& Gasteiger, 2007). Sometimes, ideas themselves may not be the cause of tension.
For example, when access to limited resources is required for the development of
novel products, it may become contentious. Even upon acceptance of initial ideas,
start up problems and intentional defiance by other employees may hinder a new
product’s successful implementation (Anderson & Gasteiger, 2007). This exact pro-
cess occurred with early PIRA incendiary devices that utilized a condom as a fuse
delay device. The device entailed filling a condom with sulfuric acid. The time the
acid took to dissolve the rubber acted as the time delay mechanism. Upon dissolv-
ing, the acid reacted with the incendiary material and produced fire. Two reasons
led to this device’s demise. First, although it was highly novel, original, relevant, and
elegant, it was highly dangerous to the operator (Oppenheimer, 2009, p. 202). The
main resistance to this bomb, however, came from individuals who refused to store
caches of condoms, previously proscribed by the Catholic Church, in their homes
(O’Doherty, 2008, p. 59).
TERRORISM, LEADERSHIP AND CREATIVITY
We must first distinguish what role leaders play in the creative process before dis-
tinguishing particular leadership behaviors that engender greater creativity and inno-
vation. According to previous literature, leaders provide structure and vision,
facilitate idea progression, champion and promote ideas to others, provide resources
and feedback, model appropriate behaviors, motivate subordinates, model
open-minded thinking, extend discussions to encourage more idea generation, define
problems in new ways, and grant autonomy to subordinates (Damanpour, 1991;
Halbesleben et al., 2003; Mumford, 2000; Mumford, Hunter, Eubanks, Bedell, &
Murphy, 2007).
One of the clearest findings in creative leadership research is that technical exper-
tise is critical for leader performance (Mumford et al., 2007). Expertise helps leaders
appraise follower capabilities, creates awareness of professional expectations, and
provides a basis for effective exercise of power (Gumusluoglu & Ilsev, 2009). There
are many examples of this behavior within the history of terrorism. For example,
between 1998 and 2001, members of the core al-Qaeda leadership actively sought
materials that could be used as weapons. During this period, Ayman al-Zawahiri’s
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) organization formally merged with al-Qaeda. Zawahiri
was tasked with developing biological and nuclear options for the organization.
Given his science background, Zawahiri was deemed a natural choice to lead the
development of a CBRN program and to procure the necessary materials (Wright,
2002). “He personally oversaw and managed the biological weapons development,
and he steered the group toward the idea that these weapons might be used to
attack vulnerabilities in the US infrastructure and economy” (Mowatt-Larssen, 2010,
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p. 12). As mentioned above, once al-Qaeda became far more decentralized, new
recruits with far less technical expertise than Zawahiri took up the CBRN mantle,
but still have yet to reach anything approaching the levels of sophistication in
planning and development reached under Zawahiri’s leadership.
A second pertinent example is that of Yahya Ayyash, who held the joint positions
within Hamas of chief bombmaker and leader of the West Bank battalion. Nick-
named “The Engineer”, Ayyash is often credited as being the mastermind behind
Hamas’ initial adoption and deployment of suicide bombings.
TERRORISM AND CREATIVITY IN INDIVIDUALS
It is commonly perceived that newcomers to a domain may be more creative than
experts because they are unhindered by locked modes of thinking. Although this may
be true in some cases, research shows that to conceptualize creative solutions to prob-
lems, an individual needs expertise in the problem domain (Walczyk & Griffith-Ross,
2008). Experience and expertise provide individuals a framework for interpreting,
gathering, and acting on information (Mumford et al., 2007; Taylor & Greve, 2006).
Having a broader and richer frame of reference allows individuals a larger reservoir
to draw from when solving problems. Specifically, expertise promotes (a) a more
rapid acquisition of knowledge, (b) use of systematic solutions rather than trial and
error, and (c) applications of the principles, relationships, and prototypic cases to
novel problems (Mumford, 2000). The value of expertise is so great that some
researchers argue most individuals take 10 years to make an important contribution
in their domain (Kaufman, 2009). The Global Terrorism Database, compiled by the
University of Maryland’s research center Studying Terrorism and Response to Terror-
ism, currently comprises information on 87,710 incidents of terrorism. Of this data-
set, 44.28% are bombings. Given the relative difficulty in understanding how to
effectively create and deploy bombings, engineers and scientists are disproportion-
ately represented amongst university graduates within terrorist organizations, espe-
cially so within Jihadist organizations according to Gambetta and Hertog (2007).
However, Mumford and Hunter (2005) identified several ways that information
can be a hindrance to creativity. Too much information is dangerous because it can
lead to information overload. This results in a loss of focus or focusing on the
wrong aspects of a problem. People may gravitate toward the part of the problem
they can understand quickly and easily while disregarding more technical aspects
that may actually encompass key components. They may become over reliant on
information used successfully in the past and fail to seek out new information.
Finally, they may compartmentalize their thinking and focus solely on their immedi-
ate work role rather than taking the broader vision often necessary to make impact-
ful solutions.
In addition to expertise, research has indicated that creative people tend to share
certain personality traits. Creative people tend to be open and flexible, entertaining
a wide array of possible solutions before concluding on a single answer (Shalley &
Gilson, 2004). They show substantial autonomy and possess a high degree of
achievement motivation, while remaining somewhat domineering and critical
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(Barron & Harrington, 1981; Silvia, Kaufman, Reiter-Palmon, & Wigert, 2011).
These traits can lead people to set high standards and thus become so dissatisfied
with their environment that they are motivated to change it in new and unconven-
tional ways.
In addition, creative people possess a firm sense of themselves as creative individ-
uals and tend to take risks (Shalley & Gilson, 2004). These traits not only enhance
creativity because they represent a personality that is not hampered by the status
quo, but also aid ideas to be heard and provide the confidence necessary to carry
them through. Furthermore, personality traits such as recklessness or unconvention-
ality facilitate creative endeavors by encouraging individuals to push the boundaries
of societal norms and challenge the status quo (Schuldberg, 2001). The types of
traits necessary in some domains may be different than those that lead to success in
others; for example, while conscientiousness is important for creativity in technical
professions, rebelliousness is a key factor for creativity in the arts (Feist, 1998). In
addition, creative people restructure their work environments to fit their needs,
which can lead organizations and industries to become more creative over time
(Mumford, 2000).
TERRORISM AND CREATIVITY IN TEAMS
While individual traits are conducive to creative work, they may also hinder col-
laborative efforts, which themselves are often necessary to solve complex problems
and require multiple areas of expertise. Indeed, the traits that allow innovative
employees to break from social norms also leave them susceptible to interpersonal
conflicts with co-workers (Anderson & Gasteiger, 2007). As suggested by Feist’s
(1998) meta-analysis of creative personality, innovative people tend to remove them-
selves from social interactions more readily. Despite a creative individual’s need for
autonomy, workgroup support strongly predicts innovation (Baer & Frese, 2003).
Several reasons explain why teamwork benefits creative efforts. First, diverse exper-
tise contributes to the pool of information available for idea generation. It also pro-
vides a greater need to articulate the problem at hand (West, 2002). Work groups
provide ties and networks that promote innovation (Hellstrom & Hellstrom, 2002).
In turn, these ties provide support in uncertain times and help lower stress. Team
members serve as collaborators and provide feedback in an environment of trust
(Mueller & Kamdar, 2011; Paulus, Dzindolet, & Kohn, in press; Pirola-Merlo &
Mann, 2004). Finally, teammates serve as role models. In a study of research and
development scientists, Amabile and Gryskiewcz (1987) found that 65% of surveyed
scientists assert the presence of a role model facilitated creativity.
Cohesiveness has positive effects on innovation because it increases group process
effectiveness, promotes awareness of team members’ skills and team mental models,
aids in more efficient decision-making, and builds trust and liking among group
members (Ayres, Dahlstrom, & Skinner, 1997; Mumford & Hunter, 2005). However,
organizational psychologists argue that a balance should be maintained between coop-
eration and conflict. Conflict can be beneficial if it is focused on the task. Cognitive
conflict is based on disagreements arising from opposing perspectives, while personal-
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ized conflict is directed at specific people and their performance (Amason & Sapienza,
1997). Cognitive conflict can induce new ideas by challenging the status quo and
galvanizing team members to reexamine their solutions. In contrast, personalized
conflict can impede collaboration and lead to a breakdown of communication.
Team composition can also impact innovation (H€ulsheger, Anderson, & Salgado,
2009). OB researchers assert that the ideal size for creative teams tends to be between
four and eleven members (West & Anderson, 1996). Teams larger than seven members
are too large for effective collaboration between team members and tend to have a
lower team climate. Teams smaller than four have fewer experienced people to draw
from, as well as fewer people to evaluate ideas (West & Anderson, 1996).
Shane Paul O’Doherty’s ascent to the role of explosives officer in PIRA’s Derry
Brigade in 1974 provides a clear illustration of creativity in terrorist teams. Looking
to improve PIRA’s quality in bombs while maintaining safety standards for opera-
tives, O’Doherty sought to re-organize the explosives division. “I sought to get all of
the individual explosives officers, whether from the companies or battalions, into a
pool over which I could exercise control, producing better training and improved
safety standards. Pooling them would make higher quality operatives available to
any unit or area, whereas before, the unit would have to rely on its own somewhat
isolated explosives officer”. Through this pooling, “groups of Explosives Officers
came together to discuss…and that’s when the ingenuity came out. And you found
that a lot of people had a lot of ingenuity” (O’Doherty, 2008, p. 123). O’Doherty’s
example shows that often by pooling individually talented Explosives Officers into a
group, the group became more valuable than the sum of its parts.
DISCUSSION
In effect, the literature surveyed throughout this article points toward a number
of key variables that may aid the study of a terrorist organization’s capacity for crea-
tivity and innovation. While each section discussed above utilized illustrative exam-
ples, this section presents two detailed case studies to illustrate the multi-causal
framework in more depth with the aim of developing a predictive model of terrorist
innovation from which we can gain predictive capacities to aid in the investigation
and disruption of terrorist plots.
THE 2006 TRANSATLANTIC LIQUID BOMB PLOT
The first case encompasses the 2006 transatlantic liquid bomb plot which
intended to use 10 liquid-based explosive devices in-flight on planes traveling
from the U.K. to North America. Discovered and interrupted before the attack
was planned, the plot is perhaps best known for the security measures put in
place post-event regarding liquid allowances in carry-on bags. The plot, although
foiled, displayed many facets of malevolent creativity. A memory stick belonging
to one of the plotters showed that the targeted flights each carried between 241
and 286 passengers and crew. Aspects of the greater environment, organizational
dynamics and individual/leadership characteristics drove the offenders’ collective
capacity for creativity.
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In terms of the greater environment, contemporary counter-terrorism policies
highlighted the need for creative solutions. The airline security procedures, such as
installation of bulletproof and locked cockpit doors, the restriction of certain items
such knives with a blade less than four inches long, the introduction of air marshals,
and improved security screening procedures immediately after 9/11 lessened the
opportunity for a repeat attack and created the need for more creativity amongst
jihadist cells. This specific plot was an incremental twist on the Bojinka airline plot
that sought to conceal 12 IEDs inside the life jackets or under the seats of separate
U.S.-bound aircraft. The most creative aspect of the 2006 plot involved the IED in
terms of its construction and detonation. The explosive mixture was to be peroxide-
based and allegedly consisted of acetone peroxide and hexamethylene triperoxide
diamine (HMTD), both of which can be found in the form of hair bleach, are sensi-
tive to heat and friction and can be initiated by electrical charge. A sugary drink
powder called Tang would be mixed with the peroxide chemicals to produce the
explosive mixture. This mixture would be injected via syringe into 500 ml plastic
bottles of soft drinks and the resultant hole would be resealed. Through injection, it
made the bottle look like it had been unopened since purchase. A second type of
explosive was to be concealed within an AA battery and the whole device was to be
charged and detonated through linking the bottle containing the explosives to a light
bulb and a disposable camera. The camera’s flash would be sufficient to detonate
the device. To deliver these devices, the plot necessitated the use of suicide bombers
who would board each of the ten planes, and construct the IED mid-flight and deto-
nate them. The nature of the IED itself would allow the plotters to pass through
security undetected. In a recent interview with CNN, a senior counter-terrorism offi-
cial stated that the progression between the London underground bombings in July
2005 and this plot was “very unexpected and brilliant” (Robertson, Cruickshank, &
Lister, 2012).
In terms of leadership and individual characteristics, technical expertise was key.
Prosecutors described Abdulla Ahmed Ali (a qualified computer systems engineer)
as the “engineer” responsible for manufacturing the storage containers for the home-
made explosive mixture. Ali had also previously received terrorist training during
regular trips to Pakistan and the Afghanistan border between 2000 and 2005. Other
members such as Adman Osman Khatib and Assad Ali Sarwar had also received
training in Pakistan. After returning from Pakistan in December 2005, Khatib used
internet resources to research the explosive properties of hexamine and hydrogen
peroxide at Ali’s suggestion. Assad Ali Sarwar’s and Tanvir Hussain’s primary tasks
involved buying the necessary equipment and prime ingredients and manufacturing
the HMTD.
In terms of organizational dynamics, recently discovered documents in Germany
revealed that much of the plot was facilitated and conceived by Rashid Rauf, a
British Jihadist based in Pakistan (Robertson, Cruickshank & Lister, 2012). Accord-
ing to the seized documents authored by Rauf, he analyzed various security screen-
ing machines used at baggage checkpoints and found they were susceptible to
overlooking liquid explosives. Rauf further notes that, “the discovery that hydrogen
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peroxide could be colored without losing its explosive properties was a major break-
through” and a good deal of time was further spent practicing “how to open a
drinks bottle, empty it, and replace with Hydrogen Peroxide, to make it seem uno-
pened”. Such resources, exposure to novel problems, goal awareness, and processes
not only drove the capacity for creativity but also facilitated the capacity for innova-
tion. Ultimately, effective counter-terrorism techniques and surveillance prevented
the plot becoming a successfully deployed innovation.
THE BRIGHTON HOTEL BOMBING
The Provisional Irish Republican Army bombed a hotel in Brighton, England, at
2.54 a.m., October 12, 1984. The hotel, at that time, housed Margaret Thatcher and
much of the U.K. government who were in town for the Conservative Party annual
conference. The explosion collapsed five floors of the hotel, killing 5 and injuring
34. What marked this event as particularly innovative was the use of a home video
recorder as long-delay timer which was set to initiate the explosive device 24 days,
6 hours and 36 minutes after it had been concealed behind the walls of a hotel bath-
room. Although an incremental innovation from previous iterations that used
mechanical clocks/watches, or memopark timers, the length of time afforded by this
particular device enhanced PIRA’s violent capabilities to a great extent. In this case,
the dynamics driving the capacity for creativity and eventual innovation were also
multiple.
Beginning with aspects concerning the greater environment, while PIRA’s deep
antipathy toward Margaret Thatcher initiated the idea of attempting to assassinate
her, the security constraints PIRA faced developed the necessity for creative solu-
tions. PIRA’s grievance against Thatcher was largely a product of her intransigence
toward PIRA hunger strikers who protested their status and conditions in Northern
Ireland jails. In total, ten hunger strikers died and PIRA largely held Thatcher
accountable. PIRA’s newspaper An Phoblacht, in the aftermath of the attack
stated the strategic decision behind targeting Thatcher: “We believe that [killing
Thatcher]…would have…led to a major and radical rethink along the lines of with-
drawal”. Aware of the upcoming Conservative Party conference location ahead of
time, PIRA needed a device capable of being planted and primed weeks in advance
of security taking position within the hotel and therefore the need for a long-delay
device arose.
The individual entrusted with the device generation and deployment was Patrick
Magee, PIRA’s chief explosives officer, who had allegedly played a key role in the
development of timing initiation units since the late 1970s. Placing an experienced
recruit like Magee as the primary operative also lessened the need for extra individu-
als to be deployed and hence maximized PIRA’s ability to keep the plot quiet from
counter-terrorism agencies. Further, Magee’s individual expertise came from a
training camp in Libya (Oppenheimer, 2009, p. 263, 282). Other facets of the plot
relied upon external support also. This plot marked PIRA’s first use of Libyan-
imported Semtex, a commercial explosive with far greater power, security (for the
operatives) and elusiveness from sniffer dogs (it is odorless). PIRA would have been
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incapable of this attack if they used their stockpiles of homemade explosives because
it was likely that security dogs would have detected the scent and perhaps more
importantly, it would have been impossible to conceal given the fact that pound-
for-pound, homemade explosives do not carry the same explosive power. For the
same impact, PIRA would have needed hundreds of pounds of homemade explosives
compared to the thirty pounds of malleable Semtex that was concealed behind a
hardboard panel of the hotel room’s bath.
The airline plot and the Brighton bombing share many similarities in terms of
their creative drivers and innovation facilitators despite occurring 22 years apart by
vastly different actors espousing vastly different goals and worldviews. For the trans-
atlantic airline plot, exposure to novel problems created by the contemporary secu-
rity infrastructure post-9/11 combined with technical expertise, resource availability,
and foreign aid facilitated the plot until it was eventually interrupted in coordinated
arrests. In the case of the Brighton bombing, grievances against Thatcher and the
security that surrounded her exposed PIRA to novel problems in trying to assassi-
nate her. Possessing technical expertise within their leadership ranks combined with
the resources of foreign training and equipment made the plot viable.
What separates the two plots is the fact that one was successfully carried out
(although the prime motive of killing Thatcher was not met) while one was inter-
rupted. While PIRA entrusted a technical expert to conceive, develop, and deliver
the IED, the airline plot’s necessity for suicide bombers to develop and deploy the
IED mid-flight increased the number of necessary actors, increased communication
between the actors and increased the likelihood of the plot being identified and
interrupted by counter-terrorism agencies. In this way, the PIRA assassination plot
was more elegant because of its fewer components and necessary actors.
CONCLUSION
Although the ability to accurately anticipate the timing of terrorist innovations
may always be beyond counter-terrorism practitioners, the same is not true for
understanding a terrorist organization’s capacity for creativity and innovation. Aca-
demic theorizing on the nature of terrorist innovation often conflates both creativity
and innovation as being the same static phenomenon. This paper distinguishes the
two and demonstrates that organizational and industrial psychologists identified a
number of recurring drivers of both creativity and innovation. It is possible to code
and assess a terrorist organization’s ability to creatively formulate new ideas and
technologies that may later become a terrorist innovation. The transition from a cre-
ative idea into an innovation may take a long time if the necessary components
(specific explosive mixtures or technology) or actors (lack of willingness of individu-
als to become suicide bombers) are not in place at the right time. The key therefore
is to understand the multiple levels of dynamic actors and drivers that combine to
form the creative process itself.
The theoretical framework has many implications for counter-terrorism perspec-
tives. First, the framework provides insight into decisions concerning resource allo-
cation in targeting specific parts of the terrorist organization that are more likely to
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be creative and from which innovations diffuse through the rest of the network. For
example, in the two case studies above, the main drivers at the individual actor level
were those with technical expertise. Related to this, Asal, Gill, Rethemeyer and Hor-
gan (in press) found that terrorist sub-units with a higher proportion of individuals
with technical expertise are more likely to produce outcomes identical to the terror-
ist organizations stated goals (e.g., to be discriminate or indiscriminate in the killing
of particular targets). Second, effective counter-terrorism policies produce novel
problems for terrorist organizations that in turn may drive the need for creativity.
Because of this, counter-terrorism practitioners may need to anticipate the second-
order effects of employed counter-terrorism policies to better anticipate how terror-
ist organizations may respond in kind. Third, because creativity and innovation are
a process, any threat assessment of a terrorist organization or group should aim to
understand the stage in the process that a particular plot is at, to tailor an adequate
response. Plots, such as the liquid bomb plot (above), that are nearing the end of
the process may necessitate the need for immediate action and arrests. On the other
hand, maintaining surveillance, embedding undercover agents, or interrupting the
resources and available time that facilitate creativity and/or innovation may better
manage plots at the earlier stages of the process. Fourth, interrupting the flow of
communication across an organization may aid in reducing a terrorist organization’s
ability to share and communicate responses to novel problems. Finally, a terrorist
group newly acquiring foreign aid (in the form of training or weaponry) may be an
indication that a tactical innovation is in the process of being developed and may
necessitate the need for increased surveillance or counter-measures.
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